Podcast:

Last week, President Obama took unilateral Presidential action to fix the drug shortages that have been plaguing American hospitals since 2005.

He has been taking unilateral Presidential action quite a lot lately, in his effort to publicly emphasize the recent unwillingness of Congress to do his bidding, and to illustrate to us in the great unwashed how much better things would be if only the President could just go ahead and do all the stuff that needs to be done, without having to take the legislature into account.

For problems like this (i.e., drug shortages, lack of jobs, loss of “spirit,” &c.) are the price we pay when we insist on holding our leaders to the constraints imposed by some old, dusty, outdated document, written by someone else’s ancestors. (For how many of us, really, descend from either the Roundheads or the Cavaliers who wrote the thing?)

There are other ways one might run an enterprise, you know, that Adams or Jefferson probably never thought of.

In any case it is somewhat surprising that this time the President failed to take full advantage of the occasion. Namely, he did not blame George Bush for the drug shortages. He missed a real opportunity there, because had he done so he would have been more correct than usual.

Shortages of certain critical drugs have become a serious problem over the past six years or so. Generally speaking the drug shortages have involved sterile, injectable generic drugs. Sterile injectables are relatively expensive to make, and because the requirement for sterility dictates they must have a finite (and relatively short) shelf life, they are relatively expensive to manage logistically after they are made.

The shortages are in some of the more important and critical drugs used in medicine, including “crash cart” cardiovascular drugs, antibiotics, and important chemotherapy agents used for cancer. In recent years increasing numbers of patients with life-threatening illnesses have not been able to receive the drugs they need to optimize their odds of survival, and they have had to receive some substitute therapy, that is, instead of getting the drug they ought to have, they get a drug that is available. When your life is in the balance this is not a pleasant thing.

The FDA keeps an on-line list of current drug shortages, which can be found here. The list is impressively long.

Many experts (the usual suspects) have looked into the problem of drug shortages, and have come up with many explanations for it. Typically, after analysis, the reason for the shortages is said to be “multifactorial,” and includes: insufficient production space, disruptions in the supply of raw materials, several drug makers opting out of the generic drug business, and a spate of manufacturing quality issues that have resulted in prolonged production interruptions. The term “drug company greed” often hovers just beneath the surface of such explanations, and sometimes actually breaches.

Here is the formal position the FDA has taken to explain the growing drug shortages. Readers will note that it invokes all of the above multifactorials.  (And since none of these manifold causes are under the direct control of the FDA, the agency concludes, clearly it is not to blame.)

This sort of scattershot explanation for the drug shortages seems unsatisfying. It seems unfocused and random. We are to believe that a series of disparate, unfortunate events suddenly began happening to the drug industry six years ago (since prior to that there was no particular problem with these drugs), with no underlying explanation, and that all these unwanted happenstances, quite miraculously, mainly affected only one kind of product – sterile, injectable generic medications. Go Figure.

Must be one of those Black Swan deals.

Undeterred by the lack of a unifying theory to explain the problem, the President has now taken action.

He decreed the following steps.  He told the FDA to ask drug companies for earlier notice when there will be a new shortage. He asked the FDA, after the agency has ordered a halt in production of a drug due to quality issues, to speed up its reviews when the drug company says it is ready to get back on line.  And he asked the DOJ to crack down on “grey markets” that have now appeared to provide these critical drugs to hospitals for exorbitant prices.

See what kind of quick action we would get if we would just suspend the Constitution?

The problem is that the things the President is doing won’t help much, and the things that would help a lot the President is not doing.

It should not be this difficult to figure out why we are having drug shortages. Yes, DrRich agrees that the proximate reasons are multifactorial. But the proximate reasons for product shortages are always multifactorial, because when the root cause of a shortage is itself beyond their control, the product-makers will always try multiple, marginally effective and often counterproductive ways to mitigate the root cause, thus creating a multitude of potential proximate causes for problems. And if an analyst does not look beyond those proximate causes he might not see the root. This often happens when seeing the root would be inconvenient or embarrassing.

The root cause of any persistent product shortage is almost always the same. For one reason or another, the cost of providing the product has outstripped the price the product-maker can get for selling the finished product.

In a free market, when the cost of production goes up the price of the finished product rises accordingly. As long as the customers can pay the higher price there will be no shortage of the product. If the price rises so high that customers won’t pay it, the demand for the product drops – and production is adjusted to reduce the supply in accordance with that reduced demand. But even in this case, there is no product shortage, because even if more product were available nobody would buy it.

Sometimes a sudden increase in demand for a product will create a product shortage. But the higher prices enabled by this new demand will entice the product-makers (greedy bastards!) to increase their manufacturing capacities, and will attract new product-makers to go into business, and eventually the shortage will be resolved. In free markets, shortages are usually temporary and self-adjusting.

In general, truly persistent shortages will only occur when the product-makers cannot increase the price they get for their finished product sufficiently to keep up with a rising cost of production. In this case profit margins shrink or even become negative, and the incentive to expand production, or even to stay in that business, disappears. This is a true shortage – the demand is still there, and customers are willing and able to pay the price being asked, but the product-makers are no longer able to supply the product at that price. Unless the mismatch between the cost of production and the price of the finished product is repaired, the product shortage becomes persistent or even permanent.

Such a persistent cost/price mismatch does not occur in a free market. It occurs when some Central Authority acts to control prices (often, to be sure, while simultaneously acting to increase the cost of production). A Central Authority can cap effective price a product-maker can get for his/her product by implementing overt or hidden price controls; by increasing marginal tax rates high enough to push the product-maker’s risk/reward calculation to favor inaction; and by instituting windfall profit taxes that do the same thing. DrRich is certain that Progressives have thought up a number of other ways to bolix-up the supply/demand relationship as well.

We do not need to know anything in particular about manufacturing generic, sterile injectable drugs to know that it is very likely that the persistent shortages we are seeing in these products are probably due to a persistent, externally-imposed mismatch between the cost of production, and the prices the companies can get for selling these drugs. And whatever caused that mismatch must have occurred before 2005.

And lo and behold! We find that a recent Medicare law (Section 303(c) of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003) strictly limits the price Medicare will pay for “injectable” generic drugs. Prices for these drugs can still rise, but only by 6% or less, and only once every six months.  Congress (in its great wisdom and expertise in matters economic) made the judgment that this kind of price rise would be sufficient to balance market forces. But Congress was wrong.

This law took effect January 1, 2005.

The margins companies get for generic drugs are already low. And the cost of making (and managing the distribution of) sterile, injectable drugs is inherently higher than for most generic drugs. So the profit margins for these drugs, already low, was severely challenged by these new price controls.

The industry reacted quite rationally and predictably to this new law.  The big companies, which could maximize their profits by devoting their manufacturing space to other products, got out. And new, generic drug companies got in. These generic drug companies do not have to bear the cost of research and development, so their overall cost of production is substantially lower than for the big companies – their business models indicated they could pull a reasonable profit even with the price controls, if all went well. But to do so, they had to employ cheaper manufacturing processes, with less quality control and less production redundancy. So, quite predictably, there were quality issues, and when these issues occurred there was no redundant production capacity available to pick up the slack. And stringent new FDA standards meant that each time such an issue occurred, their production would be off-line for months, or even a year or longer.

But for DrRich to belabor the story from this point would only be to elaborate on the multitude of proximate causes for the drug shortages, all of which are merely artifacts of the ways the industry chose to respond to the root cause – i.e., to government-imposed price controls.

The President’s executive order ostensibly aimed at fixing the drug shortages will of course be ineffectual. While it implies new regulatory zeal which will further increase the cost of production and worsen the cost/price mismatch, it does not acknowledge let alone address the root cause.

In this light, the President’s attitude toward the grey market that has sprung up in response to the drug shortages is particularly instructive.  A grey market, as DrRich understands it, is like a black market but less illegal.  And we know a lot about black markets.

A black market acts outside the legal economy to provide customers with products they cannot get within the legal economy. The price a black market dealer gets for the product simply reflects current market forces, given the product shortages which exist within the legal economy, the risk the black marketeer takes in providing the product extra-legally, the additional “security” they require, &c.  So the customer pays through the nose, but at least he can get the product he wants or needs.

The very presence of grey/black markets generally indicates that the shortages which are present within the legal economy are not inherent but artificial – that is, the products are demonstrably available, for the right price. That product’s abundance would increase and the price would adjust to some more reasonable value if only the customer were permitted to pay what the market will bear. (The true free-market price for any black market product will always be far higher than the legal economy allows, but far lower than the black market demands.)

Fulminating about the greed of the grey marketeers does not hide this truth.

No wonder the President’s new decree attempts to convert the grey market for sterile injectables into a true black market, and in this way aims to snuff out this extremely embarrassing, all-too revealing, spectacle.

Podcast:

DrRich’s last post addressed a recent issue of the Archives of Internal Medicine which, strikingly, was largely dedicated to trashing the JUPITER study.

The JUPITER study was a landmark clinical trial in which giving the statin drug Crestor to apparently healthy individuals who were at increased risk of cardiovascular disease (and most particularly, had high CRP levels) resulted in a significant improvement in outcomes. In particular, within two years, individuals taking the statin had a 20% reduction in overall mortality, a 54% reduction in heart attacks, a 48% reduction in stroke, and a 40% reduction in venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism. All these findings were highly statistically significant.

DrRich attempted to show that the criticisms of JUPITER recently offered by the Archives were sufficiently spurious to raise the question of what the authors and the editors were really trying to accomplish, and for him to suggest that perhaps they were auditioning for appointments to the government’s expert medical panels, which will soon begin determining who gets what, when and how. Indeed, DrRich will actually be quite surprised if none of these individuals end up with such an appointment. They have clearly demonstrated they have the right stuff.

Still, as DrRich also pointed out, the JUPITER study, while a reasonably straightforward clinical trial whose results seem impressive, was anything but air-tight. No clinical trial is air-tight, however, and if medicine were still practiced the way it should be, the JUPITER trial could be smoothly incorporated – with all its limitations – into clinical practice without a hitch.

But, since medicine is now practiced by guidelines, JUPITER poses a major problem. In fact, it has led to major and contentious debates between those who insist its results must be incorporated into formal clinical guidelines, and who insist they should not. On one hand, many point out that JUPITER is an important clinical trial which has demonstrated a vital clinical benefit (prevention of heart attack, stroke and death) with a high degree of statistical significance, which meets the high standards demanded by evidence-based medicine, and which therefore obviously demands a change in the clinical guidelines. But on the other hand, many others insist that the JUPITER trial simply does not demonstrate enough of a benefit with Crestor to justify changing the guidelines.

DrRich’s position – that the results of the JUPITER trial are striking and important but incomplete, and ought to change the conversation between, but not dictate the actions of, doctors and patients – simply does not obtain in the modern era.

So, unable to side with either party, DrRich observes with great interest the debate between those who want to change the guidelines, and those who believe that changing the guidelines would be the greatest of travesties.

Those who want to change the guidelines have, in their favor, the virtue of consistency. For, if one insists that every action by physicians must be supported by evidence-based medicine, then one is pretty much obligated to fully embrace legitimate clinical trials like this one that give clear-cut and statistically significant results. Unfortunately, the evidence-based strict-constructionists have painted themselves into a corner when it comes to JUPITER. They will not be able to say, for instance, “Statins are pretty much alike, so we’ll make the guidelines say ‘statins’ instead of ‘Crestor.’” For JUPITER did not study “statins,” it studied only Crestor, the most expensive statin on the planet. Expanding the results to all statins (despite a large body of experience that suggests this would be just fine) does violence to the whole concept of evidence-based medicine. It’s just not possible. The strict constructionists have therefore boxed themselves in to advocating a new, multi-billion dollar annual expenditure.

It is even more amusing to observe those who do not want to change the guidelines.

These people fall into two general camps. First, and easier to dismiss, are those who believe that drug companies are the embodiment of evil, and that any clinical trial sponsored by a drug company must be dismissed out of hand, particularly if the drugs which are being promoted are statins. (This, in fact, is the level of argument on which the main article in the recent issue of Archives relies.)

DrRich simply notes, once again, that the advancement of clinically useful medical science – in America and in the world – is almost entirely dependent on drug companies and other corporate dens of iniquity. That companies must pay for our medical research is the system we’ve invented. Furthermore, our total capitulation to the dictates of evidence-based medicine means that companies must fund large, expensive clinical trials like JUPITER before they are allowed to sell a new product, or to create a new indication for an old product. This evidence-based paradigm is inherently a double-edged sword. Sure, it creates a huge barrier to the development and adoption of expensive new therapies (which is the covert rationing dividend of evidence-based medicine), but it also creates opportunities, for companies who manage to successfully complete such trials, to create iron-clad indications for their products. For, once a product has been “proven” in a randomized clinical trial, there is no easy way to legitimately keep that product out of the guidelines and off the shelves. The makers of Crestor have simply figured out the rules. One can whip up anti-corporate emotions by criticizing the sponsor for playing the game well, but the fact that the sponsor stands to gain does not negate in any way the results of a well-designed study.

That the anti-pharmaceutical and anti-statin crowds vociferously object to the results of the JUPITER trial is, of course, entirely expected and cheerfully acknowledged. DrRich will merely observe that their position is one of default. It is not dependent on the scientific merit of JUPITER (or any company-sponsored study), and thus it adds no useful information to the debate. We can only note their objections and move on.

The second group of people who object to changing the guidelines are less dogmatic and more open to reason, and indeed (and very interestingly so) claim to be proponents of evidence-based medicine, and thus claim to be willing to follow the data to where it will lead. It seems pretty clear (to DrRich, anyway), that the chief concern of these individuals, as it relates to JUPITER, is cost. That is, this group feels strongly that the implications of the JUPITER trial are simply too costly to follow to their logical conclusion. This, indeed, is a very reasonable position to take.

Unfortunately, the only legitimate way to turn aside the results of a costly but statistically definitive, evidence-based study is by rationing healthcare. (To ration, remember, is to withhold at least some useful medical services from at least some people who would be likely to benefit from those services.) But we can’t do that, because, well, it would be rationing. Because members of this second group are unable to invoke the “r” word, they are therefore forced to find other “reasons” for keeping the guidelines unchanged. This unfortunate situation leaves them little choice but to discover ways in which to impugn the legitimacy of the JUPITER trial.

In short, they find themselves forced to engage in statistical legerdemain in order to diminish the significance of the JUPITER trial. There are several useful statistical arguments they can employ.

From what DrRich has seen, many of the arguments that have been ginned up to this end have not come directly from the JUPITER trial itself, but instead from an editorial accompanying this study, written by Dr. Mark A. Hlatky.

Most of Dr. Hlatky’s editorial is measured and reasonable. But he threw in a key summary sentence that has been greedily grasped by the anti-alter-guidelinetarians, to wit: “The proportion of participants with hard cardiac events in JUPITER was reduced from 1.8% (157 of 8901 subjects) in the placebo group to 0.9% (83 of the 8901 subjects) in the rosuvastatin [Crestor] group; thus, 120 participants were treated for 1.9 years to prevent one event.”

This statement, at least taken at its face value as a stand-alone analysis, is statistically naive and wrong. DrRich realizes that one or two of his readers might not enjoy statistical arguments, so if you do not wish to wade through the reasons why, simply skip the next two indented paragraphs.

In a long-term clinical study in which the endpoints are events that can occur at any time (such as heart attack, stroke or death), then the probability that an enrolled patient will reach an endpoint in the trial increases the longer he/she has been enrolled in the trial. But in virtually all clinical trials, the length of time different people are enrolled varies greatly. This is because it often takes years to enroll people in clinical trials, so that when the trial ends, some will have been in the trial for many years, others for only a little while. This means that the risk exposure of each research subject is different, and is proportional to the total time they were enrolled. Not uncommonly, the enrollment process is not smooth – there are periods of more rapid enrollment, and periods of slower enrollment – so if all you do is average the enrollment time (as was done by Hlatky – 1.9 years) you are likely to get skewed results. So it is simply not statistically legitimate to do so.

There is a legitimate way of analyzing such longitudinal outcome statistics, and it’s called the Kaplan-Meier method. And indeed, the authors of the JUPITER trial presented in their paper a complete Kaplan-Meier analysis of their data (see Figure 1 of their paper), and the results look quite a bit different from Hlatky’s summary statement. The Kaplan-Meier analysis reveals that the risk of heart attack, stroke, and death all increase steadily through at least 4 years (5 years was the longest time anyone was enrolled in this study), so that at 4 years, the risk of reaching one of the “cardiovascular event” endpoints was about 8% (not 1.8%). Further, the Kaplan-Meier analysis shows that the protection imparted by Crestor persists through at least 4 years, and that indeed the magnitude of protection (i.e., the difference in outcomes between the treated group and the placebo group) increases throughout that entire duration. So, at 4 years, the placebo group had roughly an 8% event rate, compared to roughly a 3% event rate for the Crestor group – an absolute difference of about 5% (not 0.9%). This is a far greater benefit than is suggested by Hlatky’s shorthand summary.

Suffice to say, then, that Hlatky’s summary statement apparently ignores the appropriately analyzed data which is clearly presented in the JUPITER paper itself, and which documents that the clinical benefit of Crestor was substantially more impressive than his widely-quoted summary statement suggests.

But as illegitimate as this summary statement may be, let us accept it at face value for a moment just for the sake of discussion, since that’s the data the anti-alter-guidelinetarians have latched on to.

Taking these numbers, the “antis” make the following argument: While the relative reduction in “hard cardiac events” is 50% (1.8 to 0.9), the absolute reduction is only 0.9%, which, anyone would agree, is a pretty small number. So, they conclude, the actual benefit imparted by Crestor is actually quite small.

That’s a very interesting argument. Let’s look at it in a couple of ways.

So we’ve got a population of patients whose risk of heart attack, stroke, bypass surgery/stenting, or death is about 2% at about 2 years, and by giving them a pill we can reduce that risk to about 1%, and we’re arguing that the absolute drop of 1% is not very much to crow about. Well, OK. But what if we found a pill that reduced their risk to zero at 2 years? That is, it completely wiped out the risk of cardiovascular catastrophes altogether. Would that be a good thing? Or would we say, “It’s just a 2% drop, really not much greater than the 1% drop we had with Crestor, so it’s no big deal?” DrRich thinks not. DrRich supposes we would think that totally eliminating all cardiovascular risk would be a very big deal.

When you’re starting at a 2% risk, then any drop in risk is going to be an “absolutely” small number. And if we’re not going to pursue improvements in outcome of such a small magnitude, then why the heck are we worrying about preventative medicine in the first place? Once you get past the big things (drain the swamps, don’t drink the water downhill from the outhouse, etc.) then all preventative medicine tends to consist of small, incremental improvements in outcome. Popular pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, preventative medicine is largely the art of spending a lot of money for this kind of incremental improvement. If we decide we shouldn’t do this anymore, then DrRich would find it unfortunate but understandable. But it hardly seems reasonable to arbitrarily focus on this one, particular improvement in preventative cardiology, and (within a healthcare system that insists it is not rationing care) pronounce that this is the one we’re not paying for.

Another way of looking at this “the benefit is too small” argument is by considering that 7.4 million Americans fit the entrance criteria for JUPITER. By giving all these people a statin, we would be preventing about 66,600 major cardiovascular events over a 2 year period. If you’re going to say that 1% is a small number, DrRich will counter that 66,600 is a big number. So do statins offer a substantial benefit or not? It depends on whether you choose to focus arbitrarily on the 1% or the 66,600.

(DrRich understands that many of his readers are not focusing at this moment on the 66,600 cardiovascular catastrophes that could be prevented, but on the 7.4 million people who will be taking a drug that costs $120 per month. But we’re not talking about cost yet, we’re only talking about whether the drug does some good. If we decide it does, then we’ll need to link that “good” to a procedure that measures whether the “good” is worth the money we would need to spend to achieve it. The “antis” try to avoid talking about cost – since that would admit they’re rationing – by insisting that there’s just not enough “good” to bother with. DrRich is simply pointing out that such an argument – that preventing 66,600 very bad outcomes is not enough to bother with – is on its face absurd.)

Another argument invoked by the anti-alter-guidelinetarians is based on the “number needed to treat” (NNT) analysis. Again they rely on Hlatky’s unfortunate summary of the data: “120 participants were treated for 1.9 years to prevent one event.” This number – which the “antis” insist is just too high – is misleading for the reasons already discussed. The real NNT, based on more legitimate statistical analysis, is plainly laid out in the JUPITER paper itself. It turns out that the longer patients in this trial were treated with Crestor, the lower the NNT became. So: At 2 years, the NNT was 95; at 4 years, it was 31; and at 5 years, it was projected to be only 25. Whether you think it is reasonable to treat 25 people with a pill for 5 years to prevent one of them from having a heart attack, stroke, or death is, DrRich supposes, a matter of opinion. But based on NNT analyses for many widely-accepted therapies in medicine today, it looks pretty good.

All these arguments, of course, are merely distractions. The fact is that JUPITER showed a pretty striking reduction in nasty cardiovascular events over s pretty brief period of time, and the only real reason there’s any controversy at all is because of the cost of Crestor.

That cost is what makes us want to withhold Crestor, even though it is imparting at least some (and, DrRich, argues, quite a bit of) clinical benefit. In other words, the high cost makes us want to ration Crestor. The fact that we can only ration covertly, instead of openly, is what makes us want to bastardize the science and do a Kabuki dance with the statistics.

If we were rationing healthcare openly, then we could do an objective, full-bore cost-benefit analysis on the use of Crestor in JUPITER patients, using legitimate and not ginned-up statistical analysis, and taking into account not only the cost of the drug, but also the cost that would be incurred by failing to stop preventable heart attacks, strokes, etc., and then determining where the overall cost-benefit result fell within our coverage criteria. If it met the criteria we would cover it, if not, not. This decision would not be arbitrary. It would be a fully transparent process, so that if the sponsor did not like the results, they would try diligently to find a way to reduce the cost of Crestor (DrRich thinks they would succeed) to a value that would be compatible with their staying in business. (And for the first time, the price of medical products would be determined by a Laffer-like curve, where a price that was too high – like taxes that are too high – would reduce revenue, instead of increase revenue. Companies, being fairly rational, would ratchet their prices down to the optimal price point.)

But since we insist on doing our rationing covertly, DrRich is sorry to say that we’re destined to keep making spurious arguments, and using dumbed-down statistical analysis to back them up. The JUPITER trial, while it is imperfect and while it does not answer every question, really is pretty straightforward. That we get so wrapped around the axle trying to fold such clinical trials into our covert rationing paradigm is simply another demonstration of the fact that covert rationing corrupts everything it touches.

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Now, read the whole story.

DrRich explains it all in, Fixing American Healthcare – Wonkonians, Gekkonians and the Grand Unification Theory of Healthcare.

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Podcast:

This week, the Archives of Internal Medicine published four (four!) articles assaulting the legitimacy and the importance of the JUPITER trial, a landmark clinical study published in 2008, which showed that certain apparently healthy patients with normal cholesterol levels had markedly improved cardiovascular outcomes when taking a statin drug.

Superficially, at least, the JUPITER study appears to have been pretty straightforward. Nearly 18,000 men and women from 26 countries who had “normal” cholesterol levels but elevated C-reactive protein (CRP) levels were randomized to receive either the statin drug Crestor, or a placebo. CRP is a non-specific marker of inflammation, and an increased CRP blood level is thought to represent inflammation within the blood vessels, and is a known risk factor for heart attack and stroke. The study was stopped after a little less than two years, when the study’s independent Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB) determined that it would be unethical to continue. For, at that point, individuals taking the statin had a 20% reduction in overall mortality, a dramatic reduction in heart attacks, a 50% reduction in stroke, and a 40% reduction in venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism. All these findings were highly statistically significant.

This study is noteworthy because it is the first large randomized trial to show that taking a statin can markedly reduce the incidence of some very nasty cardiovascular outcomes in people who are considered to have “normal” cholesterol levels. (Notably, typical LDL cholesterol levels among primitive hunting/gathering cultures is around 50 mg/dL, instead of the 100 – 120 mg/dL we consider to be normal. These primitive folks have an extremely low incidence of cardiovascular disease, so maybe humans’ optimal cholesterol level is much lower than we now think. On the other hand, the low risk of cardiovascular disease among hunters/gatherers may instead be related to the fact that many of them are consumed by various species of carnivores before they’re 30.)

To be sure, the JUPITER trial was far from perfect. Because of its design, it could not (and did not) tell us whether the beneficial outcome is specific to Crestor, or is a class effect of all statins (which seems very likely). It did not tell us whether reducing CRP levels is itself beneficial, or even whether using CRP as a screening tool is actually helpful. (The people enrolled in this trial tended to have several other risk factors, such as being overweight, having metabolic syndrome, and smoking, and it is not clear how much additional risk elevated CRP levels really added in this population.) And this trial did not tell us the risks of lifelong, or even very long-term, Crestor therapy.

But JUPITER did tell us something that is very useful to know, and with a very high degree of statistical surety: Giving Crestor to patients similar to the ones enrolled in this study can be expected to result in significantly and substantially improved cardiovascular outcomes, and in a relatively short period of time.

If medicine were practiced the way it ought to be – where the doctor takes the available evidence, as imperfect as it always is, and applies it to each of her individual patients – then the incompleteness of answers from the JUPITER trial would present no special problems. After all, doctors never have all the answers when they help patients make decisions. So, in this case the doctor would discuss the pros and cons of statin therapy – the risks, the potential benefits, and all the quite important unknowns – and place the decision in the perspective of what might be gained if the patient instead took pains to control their weight, exercise, diet, smoking, etc. At the end of the day, some patients would insist on avoiding drug therapy at all costs; others would insist on Crestor and nothing else; yet others would choose to try a much cheaper generic statin; and some would even opt (believe it or not) for a trial of lifestyle changes before deciding on statin therapy. In other words, there is a range of reasonable options given the limitations of our knowledge, as there often is in clinical medicine. As time goes by, more scientific evidence is often brought to bear and clinical decisions can become more informed. But whatever the state of the evidence, doctors and patients can generally get by without violating too severely any ethical or medical precepts that would cause objective and neutral observers to complain very much.

But in recent years, and especially now, as we bravely embark on our new healthcare system, this is not how doctors will practice medicine. Instead, they will practice medicine by guidelines. These guidelines (which, in modern medical parlance, is a euphemism for “directives”) are to be handed down from panels of experts, identified and assembled by members of the executive branch of the federal government.

And this makes the stakes very high when it comes to a clinical trial like JUPITER. For guidelines do not permit a range of actions tailored to fit individual patients (consistent with the uncertainties inherent in the results of any clinical trial). Instead, guidelines will seek to take one of two possible positions. That is, under a paradigm of medicine-by-guidelines, the results of clinical trials generally cannot be permitted to remain imperfect or nuanced or subject to individual application, but must be resolved by a central panel of government-issue experts into a binary system – yes (do it) or no (don’t do it). In the case of JUPITER, the guidelines must decide whether or not to recommend Crestor to patients like the ones enrolled in the study, at a potential cost of several billion dollars a year. It should be obvious that the answer which would be more pleasant to the ends of the central authority, and  by a large margin, would be: No, don’t adopt the JUPITER results into clinical practice.

However, the expert panels which are called for by our new healthcare legislation have not been formulated yet, and we are still operating under the “old” rules. So, still subject to all the duress which is created by unfortunately-resolved clinical trials like this one, the FDA, somewhat reluctantly, approved the use of Crestor for JUPITER-like patients in late 2009. That approval, of course, is subject to review by the new expert panels, whenever they are assembled.

This, DrRich submits for your consideration, is likely what instigated the almost violently anti-JUPITER issue of the Archives this week. DrRich theorizes that what we’ve got here is a bunch of wannabe federally-sanctioned experts, auditioning for positions on the expert panels. What better way to get the Fed’s attention than to let them know that you are of the appropriate frame of mind to assiduously seek out scientific-sounding arguments to discount the straightforward and compelling, but fiscally unfortunate, results of a well-known clinical trial?

Of the four papers appearing in this week’s Archives, three are more-or-less legitimate academic articles that make reasonable points, but do no harm to the main result of JUPITER. The fourth is a straightforward polemic, which has no place in a peer-reviewed medical journal, and whose very presence, DrRich believes, very strongly suggests that the editors of the Archives themselves must be auditioning for the Fed’s expert panel.

So as not to bore his readers any more than necessary, DrRich will make short work of the three reasonably legitimate articles in this issue. One pointed out that JUPITER did not tease out the real importance of CRP levels, or whether lowering those levels is useful. This is true, but that fact does not touch the main conclusion of JUPITER. Another article was a meta-analysis which incorporated several other primary prevention trials using statins, and concluded that there is no overall benefit to statins in primary prevention patients. Aside from the usual problems inherent in meta-analyses, a) the JUPITER study looked at a specific population of primary prevention patients not addressed by these other studies, and b) since JUPITER is the first study to show a benefit in using statins for primary prevention, it is a foregone conclusion that if you assemble enough of the previous, negative studies and lump them together with JUPITER in a meta-analysis, you will be able to dilute the results of JUPITER sufficiently to achieve an overall negative result. Actually doing such a meta-analysis, then, is merely an exercise in math, not in revelation.

The third article criticized the JUPITER DSMB for stopping the trial earlier than originally planned. The DSMB, however, had no real choice in the matter – ethically or legally – given the striking statistical significance of the benefit seen with Crestor. When a patient signs an informed consent agreement to participate in a clinical trial, part of that “contract,” a part required by law, is the statement to the effect that if information comes to light during the course of the study that might impact a patient’s willingness to continue participating, that information must be made available. The fact that the Crestor branch of the study was found to have markedly improved survival, fewer strokes and heart attacks, etc., than the placebo branch, clearly constitutes such information. Stopping the study when they did was not “premature;” continuing the study would have been illegitimate. This is why independent DSMBs exist in the first place – to protect the rights and welfare of the research subjects under the fiduciary agreement that comprises informed consent.

The fourth article is more striking (and more fun) than the other three. Interestingly, it is categorized by the Archives as an “Original Investigation,” despite the fact that it describes no investigation of any kind whatsoever – original or derivative. It merely revisits the data from JUPITER (in a spectacularly biased manner), and offers a spate of ad hominem attacks, alleging bias to the point of corruption, without any supporting evidence, against JUPITER’s sponsor, its investigators, and most astoundingly, the chair of the DSMB (who is a well known and highly respected figure, especially known and revered for his complete objectivity and lack of bias). If such an article has any place at all in a peer-reviewed medical journal – which DrRich doubts – it ought to be clearly labeled as an opinion piece, and not as a piece of original research. Whatever it may be, it’s not that.

But the most delicious aspect of this fourth article is that two of its authors, including its lead author, are members of a fringe medical group known as The International Network of Cholesterol Skeptics (THINCS), whose stated mission is to “oppose” the notion that high cholesterol and animal fat play a role in cardiovascular disease. Members of THINCS also take an extraordinarily strong position opposing statins for any clinical use whatsoever. (One might actually assume that, since JUPITER shows that cardiovascular outcomes can be improved by statins in people with normal cholesterol levels, the THINCS would embrace the study as evidence that perhaps cholesterol is not as important as it’s cracked up to be. But apparently, this argument is completely negated by the fact that statins were the vehicle for making it. Many in the anti-statin crowd would object to statins even if they were proven to cure heart disease, cancer, baldness, and obesity AND produced fine and durable erections upon demand.)

The best part of all this is that the astounding anti-cholesterol, anti-statin bias of the authors was not disclosed in their article – whose main thrust, again, was to criticize the disclosed biases of the JUPITER investigators.

The excellent Pharmalot blog noted this irony, and contacted Rita Redberg (editor of the Archives) and Michel de Lorgeril (THINCS-master and prime author of the fourth article) to ask them why the association with THINCS was not disclosed.

Redberg:

“I’m not clear this is an undisclosed conflict. The policy mentions a personal relationship that could influence one’s work. I think that could be a big stretch. My initial impression is the group has an intellectual message, but doesn’t fit as a personal relationship that could effect the authors’ work.”

de Lorgeril:

“[While it is] very important to disclose financial [emphasis DrRich's] conflicts of interest that can influence our way of working and thinking about cholesterol and statins, there is so far no obligation to provide a CV each time we publish any thing…May I underline the fact that being a member of THINCS – not a group of terrorists, mainly a club of very kind retired scientists with whom I have interesting and open discussion – is not a conflict of interest?”

DrRich may be old fashioned, but he thinks that being a member of an “out there” group like THINCS, which appears to advance selected and distorted data on its website aimed at furthering its stated mission of “opposing” (not investigating or questioning) the cholesterol hypothesis and the use of statins, might make one prone to a bit of bias when writing a broadside critiquing a study like JUPITER, and loudly criticizing anyone associated with that study for their bias. This sort of bias (demonstrably rooted in a willingness to select/ignore/distort data in order to make a preconceived point) is likely to be as strong as any that might accompany, for instance, receiving a stipend from a statin company for participating in clinical research. Membership in THINCS may not preclude one from writing such an article, but DrRich thinks the association at least ought to be disclosed, just as financial relationships must be disclosed.

DrRich has a hard time explaining how this can happen with a prestigious medical journal like the Archives. But like Sherlock Holmes says, when you have eliminated the impossible (such as, the idea that this article deserved to be published in its current form), whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.

And this is why DrRich can only conclude that several of the authors appearing in this week’s issue of the Archives of Internal Medicine, along with its editor, are in the mode of ingratiating themselves to the sundry officials and czars within the Obama administration who will be assembling the expert medical panels, those panels which will be making the momentous decisions that will determine the flow of hundreds of billions of dollars, and (forgive me) of life and death.

We wish them the best of luck in their audition, and will be monitoring the memberships of the new panels with interest, to see if any of our new friends are ultimately successful.

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DrRich critiques more arguments for withholding Crestor here.

__

_Sources:

_{de Lorgeril M, Salen P, Abramson J, et al. Cholesterol lowering, cardiovascular diseases, and the rosuvastatin-JUPITER controversy. A critical reappraisal. Arch Intern Med. 2010; 170:1032-1036.}

_{Kaul S, Morrissey RP, Diamond GA. By Jove! What is a clinician to make of JUPITER? Arch Intern Med. 2010; 170:1073-1077.}

_{Ray KK, Seshasai SRK, Erqou S, et al. Statins and all-cause mortality in high-risk primary prevention. A meta-analysis of 11 randomized controlled trials involving 65 229 participants. Arch Intern Med. 2010; 170:1024-1031.}

_{Green L A. Cholesterol-lowering therapy for primary prevention. Still much we don’t know. Arch Intern Med. 2010; 170:1007-1008.}

________________________________

Now, read the whole story.

DrRich explains it all in, Fixing American Healthcare – Wonkonians, Gekkonians and the Grand Unification Theory of Healthcare.

Now on Kindle!

Last week, DrRich noted that the Covert Rationing Blog and the ACP Advocate Blog were named as co-finalists in 2009 Medical Weblog Award Competition, in the category of Best Health Policy/Ethics Blog. (Voting continues through Feb. 14.) DrRich, ever the opportunist, latched on to this fortuitous occasion to issue a challenge to Bob Doherty, author of the ACP Advocate blog, to engage in a debate over that very topic – medical ethics. He made this audacious challenge because the ACP is a chief signatory of a new code of “medical ethics for a new millennium,” formally promulgated in 2002 by an international group of medical professional organizations (a grouping DrRich has called – for convenience sake only – the Millennialists). And DrRich has taken great exception to this New Ethics, which, he asserts, does great damage to the doctor-patient relationship and to the medical profession. (DrRich details his objection to the New Ethics here, and describes the right way to do medical ethics here.)

A few days ago Mr. Doherty (who is also the ACP’s Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs and Public Policy), graciously agreed to engage in this discussion, and promised to do so after consulting with the ACP’s Committee on Ethics, Professionalism, and Human Rights.

DrRich had hoped that Mr. Doherty would reply with a post on his ACP blog, which (since it likely has a vastly greater readership than the CRB), would more effectively give this topic some much-needed airing – and in particular, might engage some of the ACP’s membership (specialists in internal medicine) in this important discussion. DrRich was disappointed, then, when the reply came today in the form of a comment, which was tacked on to a long queue of reader’s comments at the end of DrRich’s posting.

DrRich was also very disappointed by the content of the reply which, fundamentally, was: This is a non-issue, and even if it was an issue, it’s now a settled issue. (So go away.)

Because he fears that his readers may not find the ACP’s response (buried as it is), DrRich will post it here in its entirety. But first he will very briefly summarize his complaint against the New Ethics promulgated by the ACP and other Millennialists. The New Ethics takes classical medical ethics (which obligates doctors to always place the welfare of their individual patients first) and adds on to it a new ethical obligation, called Social Justice, which obligates doctors to work toward “the fair distribution of healthcare resources.” This new obligation (which is to society) will inherently conflict, at least some of the time, with the physician’s traditional obligation to the individual patient. So, under the New Ethics, the doctor’s loyalty is now officially divided. DrRich asserts that this divided loyalty (which is now declared to be entirely ethical) leaves the patient in a dangerous position, and breaks the profession of medicine.

In the ACP’s response Mr. Doherty begins: “I asked Dr. Virginia Hood, chair of ACP’s Committee on Ethics, Professionalism, and Human Rights, to respond to Dr. Rich’s post. Her reply is below:”

Much ado?

We are surprised to see the comments about ACP and medical ethics. We urge readers to read the actual text of the ACP Ethics Manual (the College’s Code of Ethics) and the Professionalism Charter, which the College’s Foundation helped develop. Both say that social justice is a consideration in medical ethics, but the physician’s primary responsibility is to his or her patient. Resource allocation decisions are policy decisions and are most appropriately made at the system level, not at the bedside. The Ethics Manual discusses at length the clinician’s primary role as an advocate for individual patients. But it also notes the duty to practice effective health care and use resources responsibly, which are not incompatible with being a patient advocate. As the Manual notes, physicians should not overtest or otherwise overuse services:

Physicians have a responsibility to practice effective and efficient health care and to use health care resources responsibly. Parsimonious care that utilizes the most efficient means to effectively diagnose a condition and treat a patient respects the need to use resources wisely and to help ensure that resources are equitably available [i].

This is nothing new. Indeed using “effective and efficient health care and health care resources responsibly” for all patients is one way to minimize rationing as the result of an over costly system. The Manual also says that physicians and their professional societies should work toward ensuring access to health care for all and the elimination of discrimination, and deficiencies in availability and quality, in health care services. Likewise, the Charter on Medical Professionalism endorsed by ACP and 120 other medical organizations in the USA and internationally, states that professionalism involves commitments to improving quality of care, improving access to care, eliminating discrimination in health care, and yes, to a just distribution of finite resources. But the Charter explains the commitment to a fair distribution of finite resources as follows:

While meeting the needs of individual patients, physicians are required to provide health care that is based on the wise and cost-effective management of limited clinical resources. They should be committed to working with other physicians, hospitals, and payers to develop guidelines for cost-effective care. The physician’s professional responsibility for appropriate allocation of resources requires scrupulous avoidance of superfluous tests and procedures. The provision of unnecessary services not only exposes one’s patients to avoidable harm and expense but also diminishes the resources available for others [ii].

The patient-physician relationship and our medical ethics are the soul of medicine. The blog commentators are correct– it is important that we get it right.

Thank you.

Virginia Hood, MD, FACP
Chair, American College of Physicians Ethics, Professionalism and Human Rights Committee

As much as DrRich may feel he has been condescended to here (as if the ACP has found a fly buzzing around its head and has attempted to swat it away), and recognizing that the ACP has decided not to engage in a give-and-take (which, of course is their prerogative), but rather, has responded with a brush-off statement which they have chosen to bury in the comments section of DrRich’s obscure blog (which is also their prerogative), DrRich will attempt to reply as politely and as analytically as possible. (He does, however, sincerely hope that Mr. Doherty – who really seems like a good person and is an excellent writer – will not be called to the woodshed for obligating an august Ethics Committee Chairperson from this prestigious organization to issue a formal response to an annoying blogger such as himself.)

Dr. Hood’s artful (and dismissive, it seems to DrRich) statement can be fairly summarized thusly: After beginning with the implication that DrRich is making much ado (about nothing), and that she is surprised that anyone would dissent from ACP’s New Ethics, she says that the New Ethics does not entail the problem that DrRich alleges; indeed, there really is nothing new about it. Of course patients come first. (Just study the various documents the ACP has published on this point.) Cost-effective and efficient care is a part of good medicine, and always has been. What we mean by a fair distribution of finite resources is to practice medicine wisely, so as not to waste resources and not to expose patients to the risk of medical services they do not need. The legitimacy of the New Ethics is supported by the fact that it has been formally adopted by 120 medical organizations internationally (which to DrRich means that when you go to a doctor anywhere, this is the code of ethics under which they are now officially practicing).

There is a lot in her statement DrRich could comment on, but he does not want to bore his readers with a lengthy parsing of this finely crafted response. Rather, he will just talk about its main point.

Fundamentally, Dr. Hood is denying that there’s any problem. There’s no conflict between “the fair distribution of healthcare resources” and doing what’s best for individual patients – and furthermore, she’s surprised anyone would think so.

DrRich does not accuse her of sophistry. Perhaps she is just deceived.

The fact that there are huge conflicts between providing individuals with all the healthcare that would likely be useful to them, and the inability of society to pay for such a thing, is the fundamental problem with the public funding of healthcare. We simply can’t afford to buy everybody all the healthcare that would likely benefit them. There’s not enough money in the world to do that.

Consider just a few of the examples DrRich has discussed here over the years. Implantable defibrillators have been shown to significantly improve the survival of a substantial minority of patients who have heart disease, and indeed guidelines issued by cardiologists’ professional organizations indicate that defibrillators ought to be implanted at a rate of about five times their current actual implant rate. But if doctors actually did that, it would cost Medicare an extra $7 – $8 billion each year. Then there’s the fact that if doctors used the statin drug Crestor in the way the very well-designed and compelling JUPITER trial says doctors should use it, we would be spending an extra $10 billion per year on Crestor. In a thousand ways, the “best” healthcare for the individual is very often not cheaper (or better for society) than less-good healthcare, and DrRich is impressed that Dr. Hood is willing to say that it is.

Dr. Hood would likely deal with this problem, and implies so, by devising “guidelines” that doctors would be ethically obligated to follow. Obviously, it is entirely possible to convert “guidelines” from just that (i.e., a set of guidelines which doctors ought to take into strong account when deciding what’s best for their individual patients) into a set of formal rules that must be followed, and which will then be enforced by federal regulators (and their posse of ethicists). Indeed, such “guidelines” might be one of the ways in which society imposes its own goals over those of individual patients. But that is not the same thing as insisting that individual patients (who often do not fit the “average” profile) will necessarily profit if doctors always follow the guidelines as a matter of policy, or of enforced expectations, or of “quality”.

(Further, as DrRich has pointed out, the rapidly developing paradigm in which “guidelines” are becoming inviolate rules has led competing organizations to rush to issue their own sets of competing guidelines, that best comport with their individual agendas. While this phenomenon of “guideline wars” is endlessly amusing, it may not always serve the best interests of doctors or their patients.)

And then there’s the problem that, no matter how you define “waste” or “inefficiency” or “unnecessary care,” there simply cannot be enough of it to account for the runaway healthcare inflation we’re seeing (as DrRich has shown here). A substantial proportion of this fiscally disastrous healthcare inflation must necessarily derive from the delivery of healthcare that is actually useful.

So the crux of Dr. Hood’s reply – that all the ACP is talking about when it mandates that doctors fairly distribute limited resources is that they ought to practice good medicine, and if they did that simple thing no useful therapy would need to be withheld from any individual patient – is absurd on its face.

DrRich would be less disturbed by Dr. Hood’s assertion if he really thought it was simply a misapprehension of the truth. And perhaps it is. After all, her statement reads as if she is truly surprised that anyone would think otherwise.

Perhaps Dr. Hood came to her high station within the ACP’s Ethics Committee very recently, and is unaware of the history of the new Professionalism Charter which advanced this New Ethics, or of the controversy that was raised by many critics at the time of its adoption, or indeed, of some of the language that was in its penultimate version (and that was likely removed to silence some of those critics). Indeed, she cannot be aware if it, since she is “surprised to see” that anyone is bothered by the Charter, and since she believes that questioning it is but “much ado.” But to anyone who knows a little of that history, Dr. Hood’s assertion that controversy over this Charter is a novel experience, or most especially, her assertion that this New Ethics is really “nothing new,” would come as a very great surprise indeed.

First, we should note, if the new Professionalism Charter was really “nothing new,” and was just a restatement of the physician’s traditional obligation to place the patient first, and if fairly distributing society’s resources really was just a matter of practicing good medicine, then there would have been no need for a new Charter of medical ethics in the first place. And certainly the need would not have been pressing. It would have served quite nicely instead to produce some sort of document reminding doctors that unneeded healthcare services expose their patients to unneeded risk, so (based on the traditional ethical precept of patient welfare), to remain ethical they must stop being wasteful. Certainly, this kind of wasteful medicine would not produce a need to redefine medical ethics.

But the new Charter’s very first sentence describes something more dire, more pressing, than can be explained by Dr. Hood’s benign assertions. It says, “Physicians today are experiencing frustration as changes in the health care delivery systems in virtually all industrialized countries threaten the very nature and values of medical professionalism.” So: the whole purpose of this new Charter, its entire impetus, was the frustration of physicians.

Frustration? What frustration is that? Interestingly, the document does not come right out and say it. The closest it comes to spelling it out is to say, “We share the view that medicine’s commitment to the patient is being challenged by external forces of change within our societies.”

But even though the document seems strangely reticent about spelling out which frustration produced the very impetus for its creation, we can rely on the fact that the document must be designed to cure this mysterious frustration (whatever it is), and that the only revolutionary change in the document is an addition to the code of medical ethics requiring physicians to work for “the fair distribution of healthcare resources.” We can only conclude that this new ethical obligation is meant as a cure for that foundational frustration, and that therefore this frustration must be that doctors are finding it impossible to meet their traditional ethical obligation to to place their patients’ needs first.

But, as it happens, we do not really have to resort to this sort of documentary detective work to parse out the purpose of the new Professionalism Charter. That purpose was quite open at the time this document was being developed – and it produced robust controversy that was certainly no secret. One can read about this controversy in many places, but for our purposes now (i.e., in replying to Dr. Hood’s assertion that there’s nothing new here, and that it is a matter of some astonishment that anyone would find the Physicians Charter controversial) it might be best to refer to one of the ACP’s own publications from that time.

An article in the July, 2001 ACP-ASIM Observer, which was entitled, “Charter on medical professionalism addresses issues of finite resources,” goes into some length about the controversy. And it is very plain that the objection many raised to the new Charter was precisely that which DrRich is raising now in his challenge to the ACP: that the New Ethics being espoused in the Professionalism Charter fundamentally and explicitly divides the loyalty of the physician between the patient’s needs and society’s needs. When one listens to the defenders of the new Charter (quoted extensively in the ACP-ASIM Observer article), one finds the unmistakable tones of utilitarianism: We have to change our ethical precepts, the argument goes, because that’s just the way the world works now.

This article also indicates that the draft of the Physicians Charter presented to ACP general membership at their annual meeting in 2001, a few months before the final version was finally published, was perhaps more forthcoming than the final version, regarding what it was really all about. For instance, this nearly-final version of the Charter specifically admonished physicians that they must “be aware that the decisions they make about individual patients have an impact on the resources available to others.” One can only assume that this sort of explicit language was taken out of that final version in response to the critics (who were many, and vocal) to soften the blow.

Indeed, the “softer” language of this strange final version (which has all the hallmarks of a heavily edited document, beginning as it does with a heartfelt cry against the frustrations being experienced by physicians, then neglecting to spell out what those frustrations are, and never explicitly saying which aspect of the document addresses those frustrations), is now possibly soft enough, if not read carefully, to allow defenders of the Professionalism Charter to get away with asserting (as Dr. Hood has done) that the New Ethics is really pretty much the same as the old ethics, and does not change anything. (So move along, move along.)

But the New Ethics changes everything.

DrRich is very sorry about this, and is especially sorry that the ACP’s Ethics Committee, and the other 120 physicians organizations that have adopted this New Ethics, insist they do not see a problem here. DrRich assumes by this response that the ACP has little interest in revisiting its new ethical stance, and further, is undoubtedly busily training today’s medical students that doing what’s best for society is the same as doing what’s best for the individual.

This is a theme, DrRich thinks, he’s heard a lot lately.

Patients who want a true advocate in their life-and-death encounters with the healthcare system, an advocate whose loyalty is not divided between them and a society that, with increasing desperation, wants not to spend its money on them, had better go out and hire their own. Your doctor will now find it officially unethical to serve that office him-or-herself.

And meanwhile, we can now be sure that the physicians organizations which are responsible for protecting the ethical foundation of the profession of medicine are quite satisfied with the job they are doing.